TTM
Central Asia

Target Trajectory Monitor

July 2026

EVIDENCE. CONTEXT. TRAJECTORY.

Central Asia: Securing Continuity

Russia's fuel crisis spilled into Central Asia in July, cutting supplies to Kyrgyzstan and gas output in Kazakhstan. Governments across the region moved to lock in political continuity while stepping up their pursuit of foreign capital.

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01 Political continuity is being secured faster than energy alternatives are being built.

02 Russia's fuel crisis showed dependence transmits in days, adaptation in years.

03 Financial enclaves are multiplying before the investors arrive.

> ***The region can guarantee who will be in charge far more reliably than what will fuel its economies.***

CENTRAL ASIA TRAJECTORY SNAPSHOT

JULY 2026

COUNTRY	STABILITY	ECONOMIC RESILIENCE	GOVERNANCE	STRATEGIC AUTONOMY	CONNECTIVITY
KAZAKHSTAN	Strong →	Strong ↘	Strong ↘	Strong →	Strong ↗
UZBEKISTAN	Strong →	Mixed ↗	Mixed →	Strong →	Mixed →
KYRGYZSTAN	Mixed →	Mixed ↘	Mixed →	Mixed →	Mixed ↗
TAJIKISTAN	Mixed →	Constrained →	Mixed →	Mixed ↘	Constrained →
TURKMENISTAN	Mixed →	Mixed →	Constrained →	Mixed →	Constrained →

Current position
Strong Mixed Constrained

12–18-month trajectory
↗ Improving → Stable ↘ Deteriorating

__Changes from June__: Kyrgyzstan's economic resilience shifts to deteriorating after the fuel shock (Signal 2). Uzbekistan's connectivity is no longer improving, with the trans-Afghan route shut for a ninth month (Risk Flag 2). Kazakhstan's governance shifts to deteriorating as the constitutional redesign concentrates discretion at the top (Signal 1). Positions unchanged: one month moves trajectories, not standings.

Methodology and interpretation guide: target-research.org/ttm.

FROM THE JUNE ISSUE

In June we flagged that Russian fuel-supply disruption could squeeze the region's import-dependent economies. **It did, faster than expected:** Russia banned gasoline and jet-fuel exports in late June and diesel in July, and Kyrgyzstan went looking for alternative suppliers. The story graduates to Signal 2.

We flagged the Caspian crossing as the Middle Corridor's binding constraint, with record volumes testing a fixed fleet. **July brought no relief:** new vessels remain on a 2027-2028 horizon and no interim capacity was announced. The constraint stands.

We asked whether Uzbekistan's London listing would lead to further privatisations or prove a one-off. **Neither, so far:** no follow-on sales, but Tashkent moved institutionally instead, advancing the Tashkent International Financial Centre. See Signal 4.

We flagged the AIFC's conflicting rulings on foreign-award enforcement. **Still unresolved:** no appellate decision or legislative clarification. The stakes have grown: with Tashkent and Bishkek now building centres on the same model, the AIFC's answer will set the precedent for all three. See Signal 4.

REGIONAL TRAJECTORY ASSESSMENT

Central Asia: Securing Continuity

On 26 June, a Ukrainian drone strike on the Orenburg gas processing plant forced Kazakhstan to cut production at Karachaganak, whose raw gas is processed across the border in Russia. Days later, Russia froze petrol exports and began seeking emergency imports of its own. This pushed Kyrgyzstan, which buys over 90 percent of its petrol from Russia, into an urgent search for alternative supplies.

For governments that have spent the past year lining up decade-scale commitments in energy, finance and connectivity, these weeks were a first live test, and what they exposed was a mismatch of timescales. Disruption from the Russian dependence shows up within days. Diversification initiatives are years from operation. Continuity of dependence looms large.

The other continuity story of the month moved much faster, because it is the kind of project these governments know how to deliver: their own hold on power. Kazakhstan's new constitution entered into force on 1 July, and a 7 July Constitutional Court ruling opened the way for President Tokayev to stand again when his term ends in 2029. Parliamentary elections follow on 23 August. Whichever way 2029 goes, another term or a managed handover, the choice will be made inside the presidential centre.

Uzbekistan is running a quieter version of the same play. Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration, keeps expanding her external portfolio, most recently through high-level meetings abroad. This is not yet a succession plan, but the president's daughter becoming the public face of reform is inevitably a multi-layered story. Uzbekistan's own history with a presidential child is telling, but Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan show what alternative outcomes are possible.

Kyrgyzstan completed the pattern by more conventional means. On 3 July, a Bishkek court convicted Kamchybek Tashiev, until recently the system's most powerful security figure, of attempted violent seizure of power. The details of the sentence matter less than its effect: a criminal conviction makes him ineligible to run, removing the one figure who could have contested the presidential centre's control over any transition through the ballot. Whether that settles anything is another question; Kyrgyz power struggles have more often been decided in the streets than at elections, and a court verdict closes only one of the two routes. Constitutional redesign in Astana, a rising family figure in Tashkent, a cleared field in Bishkek: three forms of the same goal, political continuity.

The fuel shock and the succession moves belong together because they are the same test applied to two different systems: can the region secure continuity of what it depends on? The energy system failed the test within days. The political system passed it on schedule. Central Asia's reconnection to the world, through railways, IPOs and high-level summits, is meant to reduce the persistent northbound dependence, but the replacements are not ready. Political continuity, by contrast, is the one thing the region has learned to secure. This is never taken for granted: continuity efforts have failed before, sometimes spectacularly. Yet by now the region has settled into a normalised succession practice, one that uses elections and family without being either an electoral system or formal family rule. The result is a region that can guarantee who will be in charge far more reliably than it can guarantee what will fuel its economies.

This is the setting into which foreign money now flows. Uzbekistan's American trade opening, Tajikistan's multilateral Rogun package and Kazakhstan's listing ambitions are bringing capital into states that are becoming more open to investors and more settled at the top at the same time. Lenders will read that as stability, and it is, but of a particular kind: systems arranged to keep commitments deliverable whoever presides, rather than contested politics resolving into predictable rules. What that distinction means for the financiers is the subject of this issue's Analytical Note.

What to watch through the rest of the summer is whether the gap narrows. The reactors, railways and financing packages signed over the past year cannot be unsigned, so the question is what carries them through the next shock. Continuity of leadership helps only if it is used to build the alternatives faster than disruptions arrive. Otherwise the region ends the decade with more durable rulers and the same dependencies.

> *"Disruption from the Russian dependence shows up within days. Diversification initiatives are years from operation."*

SIGNALS IN FOCUS

Several July developments show how these dynamics are unfolding in practice across the region. Four signals stand out.

Kazakhstan Redesigns Its Political Future

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- Kazakhstan's new constitution entered into force on 1 July; early parliamentary elections are set for 23 August.
- The Constitutional Court's ruling opened a path to a possible re-election of President Tokayev.
- *Amanat*, the ruling party, is folding into a new vehicle, *Adilet*.

A new constitution, a unicameral legislature, a vice-presidency, an early election, and the folding of Amanat into Adilet arrived within months of each other, and together they rebuild the architecture through which elite roles and presidential authority will be organised for the next decade.

The Constitutional Court ruling carries the political weight. By treating senior officials' terms as beginning afresh under the new constitutional cycle, it opens a reading under which Tokayev could stand again when his current term expires in 2029. This matters because of what came before it. Tokayev built the "New Kazakhstan" agenda partly on a personal pledge: the 2022 reform limited the presidency to a single seven-year term, and he repeatedly said he would not seek another. Some observers took that as the first step toward an election-based succession, something no Central Asian state has yet produced.

The July ruling quietly retires that interpretation. Whether Tokayev runs in 2029 or hands over, the decision will be made inside the presidential centre, on the presidential centre's timetable. This is the signal: Kazakhstan's politics will proceed in the manner familiar across the region: orderly, managed, and resolved at the top.

The party manoeuvre carries the same message in symbolic form. *Amanat*, the name adopted in 2022 to replace Nazarbayev's *Nur Otan*, means a heritage held in trust, and it cast Tokayev as custodian of a system he had inherited.

Adilet, "justice," ties the party machine to Tokayev's own "Just Kazakhstan" slogan instead, and its chairman, Aibek Dadebay, comes directly from Tokayev's presidential administration. The apparatus is retained; its ownership changes. A ruling party organised around the incumbent's personal programme is the standard regional configuration, and Kazakhstan has now completed the move to it.

The unfinished elements fit this picture. The vice-presidency, the office that would matter most in any succession, remains unfilled. Yerlan Karin's move into the Presidential Administration continues the concentration of ideological and personnel management close to the president. The 23 August election is accordingly, and unsurprisingly, less a contest for power than the first operating test of the new machine: how it allocates seats, absorbs the former Amanat apparatus, and defines what the new legislature is for.

For readers with commitments in the region, the near-term implication is stability of a specific kind: a system configured to keep long-horizon commitments deliverable whoever presides.

WHAT TO WATCH

A vice-presidential appointment from outside the established elite, or clarification that the Court ruling does not extend to the presidency, would revive the transition-planning reading. Official silence on 2029 through the August election, paired with an apparatus-loyalist vice-president, would confirm the option-preservation reading.

Russia's Energy Disruption Becomes a Regional Supply Shock

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- Russia banned gasoline and jet-fuel exports in late June, and diesel on 8 July, while seeking emergency imports, including from Kazakhstan.
- Kyrgyzstan, over 90 percent dependent on Russian gasoline, sought alternative supplies from five countries; stocks are estimated to last to mid-August.
- Ukrainian strikes on the Orenburg and Omsk plants cut Kazakh gas production at Karachaganak.

Within roughly two weeks, Russia went from anchoring the region's fuel supply to competing for it. Ukrainian strikes have taken out an estimated quarter of Russian refining capacity, rationing has spread across most Russian regions, and reserves stand at about half a month's consumption. Moscow responded by banning gasoline and jet-fuel exports in late June, extending the ban to diesel on 8 July after the strike on the Omsk refinery, and turning buyer: purchasing fuel from Belarus, seeking seaborne imports from Asia, and asking Kazakhstan for gasoline.

The episode exposed several forms of Russian dependence operating at once. Russia remained Kyrgyzstan's near-exclusive gasoline supplier, the processing route on which Karachaganak's output depends, a major transit system and market, and now a rival claimant on regional fuel. A disruption inside Russia therefore travelled through several channels at once: it put Kyrgyzstan's supply in question, constrained Kazakh production through the Orenburg processing link, tightened Kazakhstan's fuel balance during refinery maintenance, and raised the prospect of Russian demand competing with neighbouring importers for the same fuel. Dependence of this kind cannot be exited by adding a supplier.

Kyrgyzstan's position illustrates the first channel. Russia's previous export bans exempted EAEU partners; the new one was announced as covering deliveries under intergovernmental agreements too. Bishkek says the duty-free supply mechanism has been extended and the question settled within the EAEU, but the precedent is not reassuring: in October 2025, a comparable squeeze halved Russian deliveries. Domestic refineries cover about 5 percent of demand, market participants estimate current stocks last to mid-August, and the alternatives remain mostly notional, with road imports of

Chinese fuel permitted since March but no supply agreement with Beijing, which controls fuel exports by quota.

Kazakhstan's most consequential response is the planned Karachaganak gas-processing plant, intended to end the field's dependence on Orenburg. In June, Korea's Hyundai Engineering won the roughly $6 billion construction contract, with QazaqGaz as operator, for a plant designed to process up to 5 billion cubic metres of raw gas annually by 2030. The execution risk remains substantial, and a contractor award is not yet financed construction on a credible timetable. The gap between the speed of disruption and the speed of adaptation, weeks against years, is what these events demonstrated.

The episode also qualifies Kazakhstan's standing role as the neighbourhood's supplier of last resort. Its own ban on fuel exports, in force until 21 November and covering EAEU states, means it is not legally supplying its neighbours even before capacity is considered. Its refineries run close to domestic demand, part of its upstream production depends on Russian infrastructure, and Russia itself is now among the claimants. The regional system has the least slack precisely when several countries need it at once.

WHAT TO WATCH

The reading holds if Orenburg repairs restore the previous arrangement, Kyrgyzstan's alternative deliveries stay small or temporary, and the Karachaganak plant fails to move from contractor selection to financed construction. It weakens if any channel closes materially: sustained non-Russian fuel deliveries to Kyrgyzstan at commercial scale, a financing and construction timetable for the plant, or a fuel-supply agreement with China at government level. Watch the Russian bans' stated end dates (diesel: 31 July) and whether Kazakhstan carves exceptions from its own export ban. The near-term escalation scenario is treated in Risk Flag 1.

Rogun Goes Multilateral

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- On 30 June, the World Bank approved a $300 million grant for Rogun's second financing phase.
- The approval ends the freeze imposed in August 2025 over financing, export and dam-safety conditions.
- In November 2025, the Bank's Board declined the Inspection Panel's call for a full safeguards investigation.

Rogun has been under construction, in one form or another, for half a century, mostly as a national project financed by whatever Tajikistan could raise. The World Bank's second financing phase confirms a different model: a staged, multi-institution framework in which the Bank leads a coordination group that includes the ADB, AIIB, EIB, the European Commission, the Islamic Development Bank, Italy's CDP and four Gulf development funds. What the new model has not yet done is finance the dam. The two World Bank grants total $650 million against an estimated $6.3 billion still needed for completion, a sum equal to roughly 40 percent of Tajikistan's projected GDP. Partner institutions have announced roughly $1.1 billion more, and the coalition's conditional target is up to $3 billion; even met in full, that would leave more than half the bill to project revenues and the state budget. S&P warns the project may never generate returns sufficient to cover its costs and could push the budget into deficit. Rogun has acquired a multilateral governance framework; the financing question it was meant to answer remains open.

What the framework demonstrably does is bind. In August 2025 the Bank suspended further financing until Dushanbe produced a credible financing strategy, long-term export agreements and dam-safety protocols; the June approval means those conditions were judged met. One full cycle of freeze, compliance and release has now run, which settles a question that hung over the first phase: the conditions are real, and they operate in both directions. For a state with limited administrative depth, meeting safeguard and procurement standards across a project of this scale is itself a substantial burden, and the 2025 suspension shows the Bank is willing to let that burden stop the money.

The scrutiny, however, has a ceiling. The Inspection Panel, responding to a complaint from downstream communities, recommended a full investigation into whether the Bank had met its own safeguard standards. In November 2025 the Board declined to authorise one, and in June 2026 it approved new financing with the question unresolved. The oversight in the multilateral package is real but discretionary: it is applied where the lenders' interests and the safeguards align, and managed where they do not. The complaint itself points to the dimension the project's national framing obscures. The objections come mainly from Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where campaigners warn that filling the reservoir could cut Amu Darya flows by more than a quarter. Rogun is not only a Tajik implementation story; it is a transboundary water question involving the same Uzbekistan that appears elsewhere in this issue as an investment partner.



WHAT TO WATCH

Whether coordination-group members convert expressions of interest into approved financing, since the $6.3 billion gap, not governance, is the binding constraint; disbursement pace against the approved phase; how Dushanbe manages safeguard and procurement compliance, and whether a second freeze cycle begins if conditions slip; and the riparian politics, including any formal Uzbek or Turkmen position on reservoir filling. A large non-Bank financing commitment on Bank-aligned terms would confirm the model is working; continued grants-only progress would confirm that multilateral Rogun remains a framework in search of its capital.

Financial Enclaves Multiply

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

- On 25 June, Uzbekistan and the United States agreed an early-harvest trade package; Moody's raised Uzbekistan's rating the same week.
- The draft law on the Tashkent International Financial Centre entered public consultation: English common law, own courts, tax incentives to 2076.
- On 3 July, President Japarov opened the Tamchy financial territory on Issyk-Kul: English-law principles, zero taxes for 49 years.

Within ten days, Central Asia advanced two new common-law enclaves and one trade opening. Uzbekistan's Tashkent International Financial Centre and Kyrgyzstan's Tamchy territory both follow the model Kazakhstan built at the AIFC: a bounded jurisdiction inside the state where English law applies, courts work in English, taxes are suspended for decades, and capital moves freely. Add the listing plans in Astana and Tashkent and the US trade package, and the pattern of the month is a region multiplying the legal infrastructure through which foreign capital is meant to arrive.

The zones are an admission as much as an offer. A government builds a common-law enclave because it cannot credibly commit its own legal system to investors; the enclave imports someone else's rules for a bounded space instead of reforming the rules outside it.

Uzbekistan illustrates what the strategy has and has not achieved. Access is widening fast: the trade package, the ratings upgrade, the TIFC architecture. The capital stock is not rebalancing: China accounted for just under 40 percent of foreign investment and

Three enclaves, one model

Common-law jurisdictions inside Central Asian states, as of July 2026.

	AIFC, Astana	TIFC, Tashkent	SFIT Tamchy, Issyk-Kul
Status	Operating since 2018	Draft law in public consultation	Opened 3 July 2026
Legal basis	English common law principles	English common law, in English	English-law principles
Disputes	Own court and arbitration centre	Own commercial court planned	Own dispute centre and regulator
Tax horizon	Exemptions to 2066	Incentives to 2076	Zero rates for 49 years
Official ambition	Regional financial hub	$20-25bn attracted by 2030	$20bn by 2031; 3,900 companies by 2035
Live question	Enforcement rulings in conflict	Final law and appointments pending	Residents beyond registration

Sources: AIFC Constitutional Statute; draft TIFC constitutional law; Kyrgyz government announcements, July 2026.

loans utilised in January-September 2025, invested $15.5 billion over the year, and operates the largest contingent of foreign firms in the country. Western engagement is advancing in the domains that are cheap to move, tariffs, framing, legal design, while the installed base of projects stays heavily Chinese. The enclaves are infrastructure for a diversification that has not yet happened.

Three cautions follow. First, credibility is earned late: a common-law centre reassures investors only as far as its autonomy from executive power holds in the first politically sensitive case, which is the test the AIFC is undergoing now, with its conflicting rulings on foreign-award enforcement still unresolved. Second, the enclaves now compete: three English-law jurisdictions within one region are chasing the same capital, and Tamchy's targets, some $20 billion by 2031 and thousands of resident companies, will be met either by real activity or by brass-plate registration, which the fee schedule, company registration from $525, makes easy.

Third, the strategy fits the political pattern this issue tracks: enclaves let governments offer investors predictable rules without extending them to the rest of society. They are the institutional expression of stability of authority rather than stability of law, the distinction the Analytical Note takes up.

WHAT TO WATCH

Final TIFC legislation and who is appointed to its court and regulator; whether Tamchy's residents move beyond registration to staffed operations and disclosed capital; resolution of the AIFC's foreign-award enforcement question, the live test of the model all three centres share; movement toward a full US-Uzbekistan agreement; and the decisive measure, whether Western investment begins to convert into realised projects at a scale comparable to China's. If the enclaves fill with holding companies rather than operations, the region will have built offshore vehicles, not financial centres.

RISK FLAGS

Several near-term pressures could complicate the trajectory described above, spanning the regional fuel balance, southern connectivity, mega-project finance, and American domestic politics. Unlike in June, not all of them are dormant: the fuel squeeze and the tungsten controversy are already in motion, and the question is how far they run. Where a topic is analysed as a Signal in this issue, only the unrealised scenario appears here.

The August fuel squeeze

Risk: The fuel shortfall in the region hardens through the August-September demand peak, with Kyrgyzstan unable to secure alternative volumes before its stocks run out and Kazakhstan holding its export ban while Russia's own claims grow.

Why it matters: July's disruption (Signal 2) tightened every balance at once, and the first choices have already been made: Kazakhstan's export ban, in force until 21 November and covering EAEU partners, puts its own market first, and Bishkek's request for Kazakh fuel sits unanswered as the ban's extension is weighed. Market participants estimate Kyrgyz stocks last to mid-August; Russia's diesel ban runs to 31 July with extension likely, and its gasoline and jet-fuel ban has no announced end. Refinery maintenance in Kazakhstan runs into peak seasonal demand. If nothing closes the gap by mid-August, the consequences arrive through retail prices and inflation in the import-dependent economies, aviation fuel availability, and the politically sensitive question of whether any Kazakh fuel flows to Russia while neighbours face shortages.

Triggers: Extension of Russia's bans past their stated end dates; any confirmed Kazakh fuel shipment to Russia; Kazakhstan refusing or only token-filling Kyrgyzstan's request; rationing or sustained price spikes at Kyrgyz retail level after the easing of price controls; jet-fuel restrictions at a major regional airport.

The southern corridor stays shut

Risk: The Pakistan-Afghanistan rupture becomes structural, and the trans-Afghan route on which Uzbekistan's southern strategy depends loses its financing coalition before the border reopens.

Why it matters: The trans-Afghan railway and access to Pakistani ports are the centrepiece of Uzbekistan's southern connectivity ambitions. Since the October 2025 fighting, Torkham and the other crossings have been closed to commercial traffic, with bilateral and transit trade suspended; nine months on, reopenings remain partial and humanitarian. The route's economics rest on assumptions the closure is steadily eroding: functioning crossings, customs cooperation, and workable relations between Kabul and Islamabad. The longer the suspension runs, the harder the volume projections become to defend, and the fallback of southern routes through Iran has been weakened by US strikes on Iranian rail and port infrastructure.

Triggers: Trade suspension persisting past the end of summer; a financing partner publicly delaying or reconditioning trans-Afghan railway participation; Uzbek officials visibly downgrading the corridor in public planning; escalation back to sustained fighting.

CKU's fiscal bill comes due

Risk: Cost escalation on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway converts Kyrgyzstan's equity commitment into fiscal strain before the line generates any revenue.

Why it matters: Kyrgyzstan is borrowing to finance its share of a project whose hardest section, 305 km through mountain terrain requiring dozens of bridges and tunnels, is its own. Construction of this kind rarely holds to budget, and the country's capacity to absorb overruns is limited. The project company carries long-term Chinese debt alongside the sovereign borrowing, so escalation flows to the Kyrgyz budget through two channels at once. Rogun, the region's other mega-project, is treated as a Signal this month; CKU appears here because its equivalent stress, the moment costs exceed plan, still lies ahead.

Triggers: A revised project cost estimate; additional Kyrgyz sovereign borrowing attributable to CKU; slippage in announced construction milestones on the Kyrgyz section; renegotiation of the joint venture's financing terms.

The Kazakhstan tungsten deal enters US politics

Risk: The governance controversy around the tungsten project escalates, entangling Kazakhstan's flagship Western mining partnership in a US political cycle it cannot influence.

Why it matters: The project, a joint venture between Cove Kaz Capital and Tau-Ken Samruk unveiled by Presidents Trump and Tokayev at the November C5+1 summit, is strategically significant for US critical-minerals policy and unusually exposed. EXIM and DFC have issued letters of interest for up to $1.6 billion in public financing against a project cost of roughly $1.1 billion; investors through Dominari Securities, a firm partly owned by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump, hold 20 percent of the project entity; and Cantor Fitzgerald, run by the sons of the US commerce secretary, helped raise $210 million for the venture. Senator Warren has formally questioned agency heads about the package, so congressional scrutiny has begun. The risk is not the strategic rationale for developing the deposits; it is that ownership opacity and political proximity now tie the project's public-financing component, and Kazakhstan's reputation as a partner, to American domestic politics.

Triggers: A formal inspector-general or committee investigation of the EXIM and DFC components; disclosure of the acquiring entities' full ownership chains; Kazakh officials publicly distancing from, or defending, the transaction; the deal becoming a named item in US campaign coverage.

ANALYTICAL NOTE

Who Finances Central Asia's Strategic Autonomy?

Strategic autonomy in Central Asia is usually discussed with reference to transport corridors, critical minerals or high-level summitry. Beneath all of it, however, lies a question of capital, and the capital is not the region's own. The Eurasian Development Bank estimated in June that the region needs at least $251 billion in investment by 2030, $170 billion of it in energy, far beyond what the region can raise itself. The projects meant to reduce the region's inherited dependencies must be financed by someone else. This has a consequence that is easy to miss: external influence over Central Asia now shows less in the map of infrastructure projects than in the financing mix behind them.

Each source of capital carries its own terms. Chinese project lending is fast and large, and it concentrates creditors and procurement in one country's hands. Multilateral money is cheaper and spreads risk but it arrives with safeguards and oversight. Rogun has now shown both faces of that package, with the World Bank freezing financing in 2025 until Dushanbe produced a financing strategy and dam-safety protocols. European corridor support brings regulatory conditions. Gulf investment commits faster and asks less about governance. Financing linked to US strategic priorities opens channels no one else will, and imports the volatility of American domestic politics into the transaction. Borrowing on capital markets trades policy conditions for market and currency discipline. Each is money plus constraint, and choosing a financier means choosing which constraint to live with.

July shows the region assembling these packages in earnest, with Kazakhstan building the widest spread. The state railway, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, filed for a Hong Kong IPO targeting about $1 billion, with

Every financier is a package: money plus constraint

Source	Offers	Attaches
Chinese project lending	Scale and speed	Creditor concentration, procurement dependence
Multilateral finance	Lower cost, spread risk	Safeguards, oversight, procedural time
European corridor support	Corridor investment	Regulatory and procurement conditions
Gulf investment	Fast commitment	Few governance demands, so far
US strategic financing	Channels others won't open	Volatility of American domestic politics
Capital markets	Diversified funding	Market and currency discipline

with proceeds earmarked for a new rail link to China: the instrument of diversification financing deeper connectivity with the largest existing creditor. A panda-bond issue is in preparation, and Masdar's $1.4 billion wind project broke ground in late June. The Karachaganak processing plant is now contracted to Korea's Hyundai Engineering at about $6 billion for construction through 2030. The field's international shareholders refused to invest on terms Astana could accept, so the state, through QazaqGaz, carries the bill; how it will be financed has not been announced. Uzbekistan combines its established Chinese investment base with new American trade access and a financial-centre architecture designed for investors it does not yet have (Signal 4).

The paradigm pair is Rogun and CKU. Tajikistan has placed its defining project inside a multilateral framework whose conditions demonstrably bind but whose grants cover a fraction of the remaining bill. Kyrgyzstan is financing its share of the railway through sovereign borrowing and Chinese project credit, with far lighter external conditionality. Both are buying the same thing, externally financed autonomy, with different mixes of scrutiny and debt.

The intuitive reading of all this activity is that diversification dilutes dependence: six lenders constrain a government less than one. In practice, obligations do not cancel each other out; they add up. A government that owes procurement openness to the World Bank, debt service to Chinese policy banks and disclosure to foreign investors has multiplied the audiences it cannot afford to displease. Displeasure rarely blocks anything outright; it arrives as slower disbursement, costlier borrowing, or doors that quietly close. Diversification improves bargaining power at the moment of signing. It narrows discretion afterwards, because each new channel adds conditions without retiring the old ones. The region's governments are becoming more autonomous in whom they can approach, and less autonomous in what they can subsequently refuse.

The test for the region's governments is practical: keep procurement open across competing lenders, keep debt service within fiscal capacity, finish what they have started, and end up in control of the assets built with other people's money. For the lenders, the test is the mirror image, and it connects to this issue's opening essay. Capital is entering states that are settling their politics for the long horizon, and lenders will be tempted to read that consolidation as creditworthiness. The stability on offer, though, is the stability of authority, not of rules.

> *“The stability on offer, though, is the stability of authority, not of rules.”*

The financial enclaves multiplying across the region are that bargain made institutional: predictable rules for investors inside the fence, discretion outside it. And July showed the discretion runs both ways, with the World Bank's Board declining its own Inspection Panel's recommended investigation while approving new Rogun money. Neither side of these bargains is rule-bound all the way down. When the accumulated obligations eventually compete with one another, they will be renegotiated, not adjudicated, and which constraint a government honours first will be decided politically. Autonomy financed by others is autonomy on conditions, and the conditions are accumulating lender by lender.

ABOUT TTM

Target Trajectory Monitor (TTM) is a monthly analytical brief examining political, economic, and geopolitical trajectories across Central Asia. Each issue identifies developments most likely to shape the region over the next 12–18 months and assesses their implications for policymakers, businesses, investors, and researchers.

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