Central Asia Trajectory Tracker
Every issue of the Target Trajectory Monitor scores five countries on five dimensions: a position (Strong, Mixed, Constrained) and a 12–18-month trajectory. This page is the running record. Cells outlined in gold changed that month; hover for the reasoning. Positions move rarely by design — one month moves trajectories, not standings.
Strong
Mixed
Constrained
▲ improving — stable ▼ deteriorating (12–18-month trajectory)
changed that month
Swipe the table sideways to see all five dimensions. Tap any cell for the reasoning.
| Stability | Economic Resilience | Governance | Strategic Autonomy | Connectivity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kazakhstan | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar▼ Jun▼ Jul▼ Aug▼ Sep▼ Oct▼ | Mar— Jun— Jul▼ Aug▼ Sep▼ Oct▼ | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct▼ | Mar— Jun▲ Jul▲ Aug— Sep— Oct— |
| Uzbekistan | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar▲ Jun▲ Jul▲ Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar▲ Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep▲ Oct— | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar▲ Jun▲ Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— |
| Kyrgyzstan | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar— Jun— Jul▼ Aug▼ Sep▼ Oct▼ | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct▼ | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar▲ Jun▲ Jul▲ Aug▲ Sep▲ Oct▲ |
| Tajikistan | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep▼ Oct▼ | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar— Jun▼ Jul▼ Aug▼ Sep▼ Oct▼ | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— |
| Turkmenistan | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar▼ Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— | Mar— Jun— Jul— Aug— Sep— Oct— |
November 2026 column publishes with TTM-11 on 11 November.
Why the arrows moved
June 2026
▲
Kazakhstan — Connectivity: Strong/stable to Strong/improving. Rail, port and eastward capacity expansion registered in the June issue.
—
Uzbekistan — Governance: Mixed/improving to Mixed/stable. Reform momentum plateaued; registered in the June issue.
▼
Tajikistan — Strategic Autonomy: Mixed/stable to Mixed/deteriorating. Registered in the June issue.
—
Turkmenistan — Strategic Autonomy: Mixed/deteriorating to Mixed/stable. Registered in the June issue.
July 2026
▼
Kazakhstan — Governance: Strong/stable to Strong/deteriorating. Constitutional redesign concentrates discretion at the top (July Signal 1).
—
Uzbekistan — Connectivity: Mixed/improving to Mixed/stable. Trans-Afghan route shut for a ninth month (July Risk Flag 2).
▼
Kyrgyzstan — Economic Resilience: Mixed/stable to Mixed/deteriorating. Fuel shock; over 90 per cent Russian petrol dependence (July Signal 2).
August 2026
—
Kazakhstan — Connectivity: Strong/improving to Strong/stable. Rail, port and eastward pipeline capacity continue to expand, but repeated interruption of the CPC route carrying most Kazakh crude now offsets them. Four strikes 17-30 July; loadings down 62 per cent over a fortnight (BIMCO, 5 Aug); shipowners declining the terminal (August Signal 2).
—
Uzbekistan — Economic Resilience: Mixed/improving to Mixed/stable. Gas, oil and coal output all fell in H1 2026 with the gas decline accelerating; jet fuel now imported from Georgia and Iraq against a 27 per cent demand rise (August Signal 1).
Held under review (August)
◦
Kazakhstan — Economic Resilience: Closest cell to a position change: July production down about 14 per cent; Kashagan arbitration and 2.356trn tenge fine enforcement. A second CPC closure or a revised budget oil assumption would take the position to Mixed.
◦
Kazakhstan — Strategic Autonomy: Tokayev proposed a war freeze to Putin at Omsk on 25 July and was publicly refused; Putin ordered a review of military-technical agreements on 29 July. Being refused is not being constrained, and making the proposal exercised the autonomy this cell measures.
◦
Uzbekistan — Connectivity: CKU acceleration offsets a tenth month of trans-Afghan closure.
◦
Kyrgyzstan — Economic Resilience: Supply partly restored but at exchange-traded prices; blackout, electricity imports, own indefinite export ban.
◦
Kyrgyzstan — Strategic Autonomy: No downgrade: Russian-Kyrgyz petroleum supply has always run on bilateral agreements and indicative balances, so no treaty right was lost.
◦
Tajikistan — Economic Resilience: Under review for September: MinFin conceded on 23 July that Rogun cannot be completed without external financing; steepest regional migration fall at minus 17.9 per cent against the highest remittance exposure. Entry numbers are not remittance numbers; September remittance data is the trigger.
◦
Turkmenistan — Connectivity: Tbilisi documents, five EBRD memoranda and eTIR are pre-financing. Memoranda are not conversion.
September 2026
▼
Tajikistan — Economic Resilience: Constrained/stable to Constrained/deteriorating. Summer fuel prices rose by a quarter to a half in Dushanbe, and the industry ministry itself names energy, fuel and logistics as the binding constraints on its factories (September issue).
▲
Uzbekistan — Governance: Mixed/stable to Mixed/improving. The census has been converted into registers, deadlines and institutions, a measurable gain in administrative capability whatever its uses prove to be (September Signal 1).
Held under review (September)
◦
Kazakhstan — Economic Resilience: Production plan cut after some 3.5 million tonnes of cumulative CPC losses; Karachaganak repair runs from September. Counter-signal on record: S&P upgrade to BBB, the first in a decade (22 Aug), to be weighed in October.
◦
Uzbekistan — Economic Resilience: Held at stable. Gas at a nine-year low with winter ahead, but petrol output up 8.9 per cent and imports collapsing through substitution; August already moved this cell on the gas story. Down-triggers for October: rationing, an import surge, or electricity deficits under winter load.
◦
Kazakhstan — Strategic Autonomy: Balkhash is now this cell’s standing watch item: 85 per cent Russian financing on a 60-year asset. The arrow moves when fuel and financing terms surface, not on signature.
◦
Turkmenistan — Connectivity: Memoranda are not conversion. October trigger: Herat section commissioning and first deliveries against the governor’s two-month claim.
◦
Turkmenistan — Economic Resilience: The refinery fire and outage remain single-source and unverified; verification is the priority.
◦
Uzbekistan — Strategic Autonomy and Connectivity: Signatures and announcements, not converted capacity, despite the India, Azerbaijan and Poti month. Revisit in October on the DP World groundbreaking, Anaklia specifics, and Korea summit deliverables.
October 2026
▼
Kazakhstan — Strategic Autonomy: Strong/stable to Strong/deteriorating. About 9 billion cubic metres of Russian gas is under discussion for 2027, more than twice the 2025 volume, compounding a dependence on Russia’s Orenburg plant to process gas from Karachaganak (October Signal 2).
—
Uzbekistan — Governance: Mixed/improving to Mixed/stable. The Presidential Administration’s new binding authority over state bodies leaves the direction of government effectiveness unclear (October Regional Trajectory Assessment).
▼
Kyrgyzstan — Governance: Mixed/stable to Mixed/deteriorating. Operating rules are becoming less predictable as the Presidential Affairs Office absorbs state assets and administrative functions (October issue).
Held under review (October)
◦
Kazakhstan — Economic Resilience: Gas output down 9.9 per cent in January–August and purchases from Russia rising (October Signal 2); real household incomes flat in the first half against record household debt (World Bank; October Risk Flag 3).
◦
Uzbekistan — Economic Resilience: Gas output down 16.3 per cent in January–August, but the import bill rose only 15.2 per cent by value. Winter is the test (October Signal 2).
◦
Kyrgyzstan — Economic Resilience: Growth of 11 per cent rests on building, public spending and credit; inflation at 12 per cent and remittances down 9 per cent in the first half (October Analytical Note).
◦
Kyrgyzstan — Strategic Autonomy: The UK listed Finance Ministry-owned Processing KG on 8 October; the Citibank memoranda are not binding. Watch FinCEN’s final rule after 4 November (October Signal 1).
◦
Tajikistan — Economic Resilience: The World Bank links fuel shortages this year to disruptions in Russian supply; the share of households receiving remittances fell to 15 per cent in the first half (October Signal 3).
◦
Tajikistan — Governance: The lower house voted on 1 October to stop applying the Rome Statute; upper-house approval and UN notification have not been reported (October Regional Trajectory Assessment).
◦
Turkmenistan — Connectivity: Held for a third month. The Awaza joint statement (8 October) named no volumes or financing for new routes.
The Monitor launched with a March 2026 baseline issue; monthly publication began with the June issue, so there are no April or May columns. Methodology: positions and trajectories are set at each issue's close against the previous month's record, so arrows reflect genuine movement rather than a fresh guess. Assessments draw on Russian-, Kyrgyz-, Tajik- and Uzbek-language primary reporting alongside English-language sources, verified to the standard described at target-research.org/ttm. The tracker is updated on each issue's publication day. © Target Research, Bishkek.